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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
PROCEDURE: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: BORROWING STATUTE
With certain exceptions not relevant here, matters concerning 'the
statute of limitations are procedural and therefore governed by the law
of the forum." Most, if not all, states have borrowing statutes, the gen-
eral purpose of which is to bar an action in the forum state if it is barred
by the state where the cause of action arose. Ohio has such a statute."2
Most, if not all, states also have tolling statutes, by which the statute of
limitations stops running during the absence of the defendant from the
state. In Palmieri v. Abart,3 the cause of action arose in West Virginia,
which had a one-year statute of limitations as opposed to Ohio's two-year
statute. However, some months after the accrual of the cause of action,
the defendant moved from West Virginia to Ohio, which, by the West
Virginia tolling statute, stopped the running of the West Virginia statute
of limitations. More than one year but less than two years after the cause
of action arose, plaintiff brought suit in Ohio. The court held that the
action was barred by the one-year West Virginia statute despite the fact
that under West Virginia law it was not barred because the tolling statute
stopped the running of the one-year limitation. The court took the posi-
tion that a borrowing statute is intended to borrow only the time limita-
tion of the other state's statute, not its tolling provisions. The court said
that this is the universal rule. As a matter of fact, the general rule ap-
pears to be exactly the opposite. 4 However, the Ohio cases cited in the
opinion justify the court's decision based on Ohio law. Moreover, the
present wording of the Ohio statute differs from that of almost every
other statute. But apparently this difference in wording, which is a change
from the original statute, was inadvertent. 5
FLETCHER R. ANDREWS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Judicial review of constitutional issues is a unique contribution to
jurisprudence made by the American legal system. This power exercised
by the courts is awesome. Two cases in 1960 remind one that in inter-
preting the law on constitutional issues the judiciary must not "change
11. See RES'ATEmiNT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 603, 604 (1934).
12. Omo REv. CoDE § 2305.20.
13. 111 Ohio App. 195, 167 NX.E.2d 353 (1960). See also discussion in Civil Procedure
section, p. 457 supra.
14. Nordstrom, Ohio's Borrowing Statute of Limitations - A Quaking Quagmire in a Dis-
mal Swamp, 16 OHio ST. L.J. 183, 203 (1955); Annot., 149 A.LR. 1224, 1231 (1944);
Annor., 75 A.L.R. 203, 228 (1931).
15. Nordstrom, Ohio's Borrowing Statute of Limitations - A Quaking Quagmire in a Dis-
mal Swamp, 16 Omo ST. L.J. 183, 192-93 (1955); Annor., 21 Ohio Op. 107 (1941).
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the statutes to conform to what the courts consider a better rule. This
would be judicial legislation .... It isn't the province of any court to
say what the law should be; it is its duty to try to determine what the
law is."'  Furthermore, when it comes to executive enforcement of laws,
the Ohio Supreme Court stated: "[I]n the determination of the consti-
tutionality of an ordinance or statute, a court must, of course, indulge
in the absolute presumption that such ordinance or statute is in fact
strictly enforced."
TAKING PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
The substantive due process issue of unconstitutionally depriving a
person of his property was most prevalent last year. Primarily zoning
cases were involved. This fact is understandable. Land in Ohio is be-
coming of much greater value with population growth, industrial ex-
pansion and commercial development. Property law today involves
basically the use of land. Legal issues in the traditional property field,
e.g., fee simple absolutes, springing uses and life tenancies, have been
replaced in the courts with issues involving residential uses, nonconform-
ing uses and building permit issuances.'
The Ohio Supreme Court last year considered for a second time
the case of Curtiss v. City of Cleveland.4 In that case, the municipality
had amended its zoning ordinance. Property which had originally been
zoned for retail business and had been valued at $100 to $200 per front
foot was rezoned to make such use nonconforming. Further, the en-
largement of such nonconforming use was restricted and its elimination
provided for under certain circumstances. The value of the land then
became $20 to $85 per front foot. A majority of the court reaffirmed
its prior rule in the earlier Curtiss case, holding that such amendments
are not in violation of the due process clause where the legislation bears
a real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or general
welfare. In balancing this relationship the court now appears to con-
sider (1) whether the financial loss to the landowner is great, and
(2) whether a substantial part of the property has been used for uses
other than those permitted by the zoning amendment. As an unconsti-
1. State ex rel. Ebersole v. Hurst, 165 N.E.2d 235, 236 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (holding
that despite legislative incongruities, the civil service seniority rules required seniority credit
for a fireman on promotion examination grade for municipal service of 12 years outside
fire department).
2. Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 171 Ohio St. 104, 108, 168 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1960)
(holding any person whose legal relations are affected by a municipal ordinance may have
the validity of the ordinance determined and obtain a declaration of his legal relations).
3. To reflect this basic shift of emphasis in Property Law, Western Reserve University Law
School in the next year will introduce a new course in LAND USE PLANNING.
4. 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 (1959). For prior case see Curtiss v. City of Cleve-
land, 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N.2d 177 (1957).
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rational taking of property had occurred, the requested injunctive relief
against the zoning amendment was upheld.
The dissenting judge in this second Curtiss case contended that the
decision rested solely on the record compiled for the first case without
any new evidence being presented to the lower court, and since the first
Curtiss case had been remanded for additional evidence, he felt that the
decision in that case should be left undisturbed. The dissent also ob-
served that no standards were set in the majority opinion by which the
public benefit could be weighed against the financial loss to the land-
owner. Finally, the dissent contended that the zoning ordinance itself
provided a method for relief in individual cases like these as well as a
method to extend nonconforming uses on reasonable terms. No new
evidence existed to justify any injunctive relief, so the zoning amendment
should have been upheld.
This year the Ohio Supreme Court also held that a zoning ordinance
in effect at the time of an application for a building permit determines
the right to the permit. An attempt to apply a zoning amendment
passed after the permit application but before the permit issuance would
be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.5
A denial of a change in use to permit a retail gasoline station from
locating at the corner of a busy thoroughfare, which already had three
such stations within a half mile radius, on the ground of traffic con-
gestion, was held to be an invalid taking of property.' Another zoning
change was also held to be a violation of due process." To prevent fu-
ture industrial traffic through a residential area, a reclassification from
light industrial to residential was made. The area was already one-third
industrial. The landowner had been offered $9000 under the 'prior
dassification, but after the change the property became practically worth-
less because of its isolated position. The court again emphasized that
public authorities have no right to adopt zoning changes to regulate
traffic.
A series of other property deprivation cases involved matters other
than land. Where a vendor under the retail sales tax rules fails to keep
adequate records, the Tax Commissioner can refuse the tax return, make
test checks of the taxpayer's business for representative periods, collect
other sales information and determine the proportion of taxable retail
sales to all retail sales without violating the due process protection!
5. Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651 (1960). See also discussion
in Municipal Corporations section, p. 539 infra.
6. State ex rel. Husted v. Woodmansee, 169 N.Y-2d 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also
discussion in funicipal Corporations section, p. 541 infra.
7. Brockman v. Morr, 168 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
8. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bowers, 170 Ohio St. 405, 166 N.E.2d 139 (1960). See also discus-
sion in Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 441 supra.
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However, for a municipality to require property owners to construct or
repair driveway entrances with concrete when blacktop in reasonably
good condition had been in existence for a number of years was held to
be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.9 Likewise, a city ordi-
nance which permitted confiscation of an automobile unlawfully used as a
taxicab without providing a hearing in which an innocent auto owner
could establish he had not given his permission for such use was another
invalid taking under the due process clause.'0
The state's power to tax the pari-mutual betting at race tracks and
to use the revenue derived for state, county and independent fairs ap-
pears to be as absolute as the power to confiscate, without running
afoul of the due process clause. Race track owners had no standing to sue
to test the 1959 Horse Race Act" which increased the tax. In Cleve-
land Raceways Incorporated v. Bowers,'2 the court observed that the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution was not violated by such action, for the privi-
leges and immunities protected by this amendment were those owing
their existence to the federal government, its national character, consti-
tution or laws.
OBSCENITY AND THE FREE PRESS
Obscenity, as a legal issue, continued to challenge the Ohio judiciary
in 1960. The experience of previous years was repeated;' 3 however,
this year the areas of controversy differed. What is obscene - the prob-
lem of definition - apparently is no longer significant. The test pro-
nounced by the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States4
is operating well. Certain procedural issues, however, which involve law
enforcement against obscene literature, did result in major decisions last
year. In one case, State v. Mapp,'5 police officers entered a citizen's
house without a search warrant and seized obscene materials without
offensive physical force. The prosecution proceeded under Ohio Revised
Code section 2905.34. The defendant had rented a room in her home
to a boarder. Upon the boarder's departure she found obscene books
9. Stueve v. City of Cincinnati, 168 N.E.2d 574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
10. Lindsay v. City of Cincinnati, 168 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
11. OHIO REv. CODE § 3769.081 (Supp. 1960).
12. 163 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
13. Schroeder, Constitutional Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEST RES. L. REV.
356 (1960).
14. 354 U.S. 476 (1957): whether to the average adult person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to
prurient interest.
15. 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960). See also discussion in Evidence section,
p. 520 infra and in Criminal Law and Procedure section, p. 488 infra.
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and pictures in the room. After packing all the boarder's belongings,
defendant stored the goods until the boarder would come for them. A
majority of the supreme court believed the Ohio statute to be unconsti-
tutional. They felt that prosecution for the mere knowing possession, in-
nocently acquired, with no intention of again looking at the obscene ma-
terials, violated the liberty protection of the fourteenth amendment. How-
ever, since the court of appeals had upheld the statute's constitutionality,
under the Ohio Constitution article 4 section 2 at least six supreme court
judges must concur in order to hold the statute unconstitutional and
therefore, the court of appeals decision had to be upheld. A vigorous
dissent by two judges objected to the conviction on the ground that the
evidence had been illegally seized and called for the modification and
clarification of State v. Lindway,'8 which approved the use of illegally
seized evidence in criminal trials.
With the validity of the Ohio obscenity law resting on such a ques-
tionable ground after the MVapp case, the Cincinnati Municipal Court deft-
ly handled an obscenity case prosecuted under the city ordinance.' The
court acknowledged that a municipal ordinance cannot make a certain
course of conduct a misdemeanor if a general statutory enactment makes
the identical offense a felony.' However, the court concluded that no
valid state obscenity statute existed as the Ohio Revised Code section
2905.34 was modified by section 3767.01. This modification made sec-
tion 2905.34 unconstitutional for section 3767.01 provided that no prose-
cution could proceed under section 2905.34 against literature which had
been granted a second class mail permit. This delegation of authority to
the federal postal authorities to determine what was obscene under Ohio
law was said to be an illegal and an unreasonable classification favoring
the second class mail permit literature. On this analysis section 2905.34
was invalid, and therefore, no state felony existed and conviction of de-
fendant under the city ordinance was constitutional if the Roth test be
proved, which it was.
The new injunctive procedure against obscene literature provided by
a 1959 amendment in Ohio Revised Code section 2904.343 was also
held constitutional last year."9 Patterned after the New York law which
the United States Supreme Court upheld as constitutional,2" this section
permits an injunction after an equity trial to determine the obscenity
16. 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936). See also discussion in Evidence section, p. 520
infra.
17. City of Cincinnati v. King, 168 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960). See also discus-
sion in Criminal Law and Procedure section, p. 489 infra.
18. City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958). See discussion
in Municipal Corporations section, p. 537 infra.
19. State ex rel. Bell v. Mahoning Valley Distrib. Agency, 169 N.X.2d 48 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
20. ingsley Books Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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issue. If the literature be obscene, its destruction is ordered. No jury
trial is given since no imprisonment is provided. No prior restraint or
censorship occurs for the literature is tested only after it is published.
The degree of proof set by the court in such obscenity cases is that the
evidence must be clear, convincing and unequivocal. The test of ob-
scenity was the Roth test. Upon this basis the book Sex Life of A Cop
was held to be obscene, and was ordered seized and destroyed in Mahon-
ing County.
UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
The Ohio courts affirmed the validity of certain acts of the Director
of Highways commented upon in last year's survey.2 The Director
can conduct work on a federal aid highway without the consent of the
municipality and it is not an improper delegation nor a violation of muni-
cipal self-government.2 Nor did an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative powers exist when the Turnpike Commission was authorized to
adopt rules for traffic regulation. The Commission had set a speed limit
of sixty-five miles per hour on the turnpike. Conviction of defendant
for violation of this rule was held constitutional.23 The Director of
Highway Safety can also be constitutionally delegated the authority to
promulgate rules relative to driver training schools, including a rule
prohibiting a driver's license examination in a dual control car. The regu-
lations are based upon the public safety or welfare of driver training stu-
dents, which is the expressed legislative policy.24
That hardy perennial of economic regulation, the Fair Trade Law, was
held invalid last year.25 It was described as an invalid delegation to
private persons as well as an unconstitutional exercise of the police power
totally unrelated to the general welfare, for it was a price-fixing act rather
than an act to protect good-will and trade-mark products.
STATE CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS
Several cases in 1960 considered specific problems of the state con-
stitution not generally related to broader constitutional problems such as
"due process" or "unlawful delegation."
21. Schroeder, Constitutional Law, Survey of Ohio Law - 1959, 11 WEST. REs. L. REV.
360 (1960).
22. City of Lakewood v. Thormeyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960).
23. State v. Cunningham, 168 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in
Criminal Law and Procedure section, pp. 489-90 infra and in Administrative Law and Pro-
cedure section, p. 444 supra.
24. In the Matter of Adoption of Rules and Regulations Relative to Driver Training Schools,
165 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio C.P. 1958) interpreting OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4508.01-.03, .99. See
also discussion in Administrative Law and Procedure section, p. 443 supra.
25. Helena Rubenstein, Inc. v. Cincinnati Vitamin & Cosmetic Distrib. Co., 167 N.E.2d 687
(Ohio C.P. 1960). See also discussion in Trade Regulation section, p. 580 infra.
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A county being merely the local agency of the state is protected with
sovereign immunity from a tort action of a tenant injured in a building
where the county was the landlord and failed to maintain stairway hand-
rails. In the absence of statutory authorization the county cannot be
sued2
The recent statute authorizing the Director of Highways to enter an
agreement with the School Employees Retirement Board2 was held con-
stitutional28 The Director acts as agent of the Board to acquire land
deemed necessary for highways. The Board must purchase the land in the
biennium unless the agreement be renewed for periods not exceeding two
years with purchase not later than five years from original agreement.
No debt would be created within the contemplation of the Ohio Con-
stitution article 8 sections 1, 2 (c) and 3.
The last paragraph of Ohio Revised Code section 2301.02 was held
unconstitutional. It was in direct conflict with article 4 section 13 of
the Ohio Constitution. The statute sought to reduce the number of
common pleas judges. It was applied to a judge appointed to a vacancy
when he sought to file nominating petitions for the unexpired term
election. The constitutional provision authorizes election for the un-
expired term and therefore, the statutory reduction when applied to this
judge was unconstitutional2
The constitutional right to a grand jury indictment before a felony
trial can be waived by the accused when a statute permits such waiver.
The criminal proceeding is based on information only to eliminate de-
lay. The 1959 statute so providing was held to be constitutional."0
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION POWERS
A city ordinance providing for a $500 fine or up to six months im-
prisonment for driving while intoxicated was held in conflict with the
state statute which provides the same fine and not less than three days
nor more than six months imprisonment.3 The state statute further
prohibits a court from suspending the first three days of any sentence.
Since the municipal ordinance permits judicial discretion on the imprison-
ment it is invalid as it contravenes a stricter statute of general applica-
26. Schaffer v. Board of Trustees of the Franklin County Veteran's Memorial, 171 Ohio St.
228, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960).
27. OHIO REV. CODE § 5501.112.
28. State ex rel. Preston v. Ferguson, 170 Ohio St. 450, 166 N.E.2d 365 (1960).
29. State ex rel. Gusweiler v. Board of Elections, 170 Ohio St. 273, 164 N.E.2d 407 (1960).
30. State v. Centers, 162 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio CP. 1959) held the statute unconstitutional.
Ex parte Stephens, 171 Ohio St. 323, 170 NXE.2d 735 (1960), however, held the waiver stat-
ute valid. See also discussion in Criminai Law and Procedure section, pp. 491-92 infra.
31. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4511.19, .99.
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tion." Also, a municipality could suspend a civil service employee up
to thirty days for purposes of discipline without a hearing before the com-
missioner, or right of appeal to the commission. Employees in classified
service do not have a vested right to their employment.m
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
One aspect of the procedural process due a person is an ascertainable
standard of conduct before a criminal conviction is constitutional. Two
municipalities sought to enforce ordinances prohibiting unlawful congre-
gating on the streets. In one instance the ordinance was deemed too
vague for men of common intelligence to guess its meaning.34 In an-
other the failure to lay down rules or standards for the valid exercise of
the police power was held to be arbitrary and unconstitutional.3 5
In State Tax Commissioner v. Griesmeyer,6 the Tax Commissioner
filed an assessment for retail sales taxes and the court clerk entered a so-
called judgment, issued a certificate of lien, an execution and an aid of
execution. The court held that the clerk could not enter such a "judg-
ment," for this is a judicial function; however, he could do the ministerial
act of acquiring a lien for the state and enforcing that lien.
UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION
No denial of equal protection occurred when a mutual life insurance
company, which had changed from a fraternal benefit society, was re-
quired to compute its annual franchise tax including both the premium
income of the fraternal benefit certificates and the mutual life insurance.
As a fraternal benefit society, the business had tax exempt status."
State ex rel. McElroy v. A. M. Kinney Incorporated"s held that the
amendment prohibiting a corporation from engaging in professional en-
gineering, which is inapplicable to corporations already in existence, does
not create an unconstitutional discrimination in favor of such corpora-
tions existing at the time of the amendment.
COMMERCE CLAUSE
So thoroughly has the economic life of America become an inter-
state activity under federal control that it is an unusual event when a
32. City of Toledo v. Ransom, 169 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
33. Shok v. City of Cleveland, 168 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
34. City of Cleveland v. Baker, 167 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion
in Criminal Law and Procedure section, p. 490 infra.
35. City of Toledo v. Sims, 169 N.E.2d 516 (Ohio Munic. Ct. 1960).
36. 170 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio C.P. 1960).
37: Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 170 Ohio St. 217, 163 N.E.2d 352 (1959).
38. 171 Ohio St. 193, 168 N.E.2d 400 (1960). See also discussion in Corporations section,
p. 479 infra.
[June
